Trouble on the High "C's" -China, Cyber, and the Trading System Commenting on the first great era of globalization, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that "the vast increase in the rapidity of communication has multiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting the interests of nations to one another, till the whole now forms an articulated system, not only of prodigious size and activity, but of an excessive sensitiveness…National nerves are exasperated by the delicacy of financial situations and national resistance to hardship is sapped."3
Mahan worried over the impact of commercial and economic dependencies that developed as new forms of transportation and communications (e.g. steam-powered shipping, rail, and global cable communications) spurred a growth surge in global trade and finance that, while improving standards of living and enriching nations also created new vulnerabilities as nations became less self-sufficient.
Mahan's thoughts are as applicable today as they were over a century ago. For the past 70 years, the United States and Europe (later joined by allies in Asia), have pressed to rebuild and extend trade and financial relationships torn apart by World Wars I and II and the Great Depression. A key achievement in those efforts was the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the framework governing much of international trade. The GATT (1948) , extended via the WTO (1994) , established a set of rules to promote free and fair trade (generally based on free market principles of economists 1 Please cite as: Fisher, Robert, "Trouble on the High "C's" -China, Cyber, and the Trading System," in Demchak, Chris C. and Benjamin Schechter, eds. Military Cyber Affairs: Systemic Cyber Defense 3, no. 2 (2018) . 2 Hills & Company, International Consultants. The views expressed are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Hills & Company or its clients. 3 Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies," in Retrospect and Prospect, Studies in International Relation Naval and Political, London, 1902, p. 144 found here: https://books.google.com/books?id=MvpNAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA137&lpg=PA137&dq=alfred+thayer+mahan+Cons iderations+governing+the+dispositions+of+navies&source=bl&ots=xvxgFfGdie&sig=qInZPn6DxOTtizgRWZgvAs LVuYA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAp9aIypHaAhVBNd8KHSKlByMQ6AEIPjAF#v=onepage&q=alfred%20t hayer%20mahan%20Considerations%20governing%20the%20dispositions%20of%20navies&f=false 2 like Adam Smith and David Ricardo), a forum for the progressive elimination of trade barriers (first in mining and manufactured goods, but now extended to agriculture, services, and intellectual property, and a mechanism that when created was believed to provide a fairly swift and sure means to enforce trade commitments.
For the first fifty years of the revitalized trading system, it generally was smooth sailing.
While there were the inevitable trade disputes, the system functioned well under the overall leadership of the "Quad" countries -the United States, EU, Japan, and Canada. Important trade issues often were first discussed among the Quad, and consensus (or near consensus) was reached before the results were multilateralized out to other GATT/WTO members for review, amendment, and adoption. For many GATT/WTO members, that process worked well, since little was expected from them in terms of ongoing trade liberalization commitments as long as they did not obstruct what the Quad was trying to do.
Under the GATT/WTO, world trade grew substantially, boosting global gross domestic product (GDP). From 1960 to 2000, global GDP grew from US$1.37 trillion to US$33.6 trillion (24.5 times). 4 During that same period, global exports of goods and services spiked from US$157.1 billion to US$7.9 trillion (50.2 times).
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The single largest economy in this system and its principal driver was the United States.
Beyond the wealth creation and economic benefits, at its core, the system leveraged U.S. power.
Washington led the system and was the prime mover behind progressive global trade liberalization.
And it did so by negotiating with close allies who shared common beliefs in the underlying principles of the trading system and who more or less operated on the same basic market principles as the United States.
But as the 20 th Century closed, two new and sometimes mutually reinforcing disrupters emerged whose combined impact raises questions about whether the basic operating principles of the postwar system still are warranted and, if so, how that system might adapt to the challenges posed by these agents.
They were China and cyber.
China grew into an increasingly important market, competitor, and supplier in global trade.
Cyber 6 became one of the great levelers for production and trade, fueling expansive growth of supply chain networks, outsourced production and services, and increased trade in cyber hardware and services. And the two interacted, with cyber both helping to fuel China's export-led growth and to become a sector that that China determined essential to its future, both economically and strategically, and so set out state-directed plans to achieve dominance in that area, oftentimes through policies that appear unfair or predatory.
China
In December 2001, after 15 years of negotiations, China joined the WTO. In its accession, China made significant commitments to market access, national treatment, IPR protection, transparency, domestic subsidies reduction, among others, to bring its domestic trade and regulatory regime into conformity with its WTO obligations. 7 There was a hope and expectation that bringing China into the WTO would further the internal reform process within China which, under the leadership at the time, seemed to be moving toward a more market-oriented economy, reducing China's impact as a disruptive non-market force in a market-drive global economy. 
Cyber
Adapting to China's emergence as a global trade power was one challenge for the global trading system and the United States. Compounding it was the simultaneous emergence of ICT/cyber/high-tech as an increasingly important influencer in its own right on trade and investment and as a force multiplier for China.
Prior to the late 1990s, the cyber world was not on the trade agenda. During the last major multilateral trade round -the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994 -words such as "digital" and "ecommerce" do not appear once in the 504 pages of negotiated agreements.
That is not to say the negotiations were totally divorced from cyber. There were negotiations on telecommunications services, but there was no holistic focus on cyber/ICT/high technology and their implications for the trading system.
It was only through the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) that 26 WTO Members agreed in 1996 to eliminate tariffs on many high technology products, such as semiconductors, software, computers, semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment, and scientific instruments, along with the majority of parts and accessories for these items. According to the WTO, ITA now covers roughly 97 percent of global trade in these IT products.
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Under ITA liberalization, exports of ITA products more than tripled from 1996 to 2015, growing from $549 billion to $1.7 trillion, despite significant price decreases for many of these products. 16 The shift in market shares of leading exporters was significant and almost all to Where the immediate postwar trading system and its rules assumed activity based on moving goods from one country to another, the system today is far more complex, involving goods Cyber has yielded real benefits to the global economy and the trading system, but it has also introduced significant challenges, as well as gaps that have been exploited, fairly and unfairly.
• At its most basic, cyber forces us to reconsider what comparative advantage means in an era where knowledge is key, information can be transmitted anywhere rapidly with minimal costs, and the pace of innovation is increasing. Offshoring and outsourcing present challenges to the United States in both manufacturing and services, and particularly in knowledge and innovation-driven output, areas where the United States traditionally has enjoyed an advantage.
• Cyber technology vastly increases the scope and speed for predatory practices that steal comparative advantage (knowledge, R&D, basic business information), which China has used to its benefit. As USTR notes, "…evidence from U.S. law enforcement and private sources indicates that the Chinese government has used cyber intrusions to serve its strategic economic objectives. has not been adept at addressing this challenge.
• The expansion and diffusion of global commerce and production and the emergence of China as a major nexus in these chains creates a mutual dependency that could be used by and is doing what it deems necessary, within the confines of a statist system organized to achieve its goals via policies that often appear questionable under WTO rules or inimical to free market principles.
Looking Forward
Does the combination of cyber and China introduce ungovernable instabilities or vulnerabilities that require us to rethink the basic premises of the trading system? Or are there ways to think about addressing existing concerns without starting over so that we accommodate these two change agents while reducing the tensions they individually and together have introduced into the trading system.
In looking at this set of questions, the starting point for this paper is two basic assumptions:
• The postwar trading system, while at times flawed and inefficient, is worth preserving: Thanks to the GATT/WTO framework and disciplines, the world's $20.2 trillion in exports of goods and commercial services 30 (including those impacted by ICT/cyber) generally takes place without great difficulty. For cross border flows where there are no real trade issues, or where the issues fall within the traditional bucket of WTO coverage and concerns (e.g. market access for goods, dumping, subsidies, safeguards, etc.) the system generally works well in providing a common set of rules of the road for engaging in trade relationships. There is no reason to abandon this system or its underlying precepts.
• The trading system has proven it can adapt when needed. For its first 46 years, the GATT largely focused on manufactured goods. There were few attempts to deal with agricultural issues, and none for services and intellectual property. There was no mandatory dispute settlement process. That changed when GATT members updated the GATT and created the WTO, bringing these and other issues under fresh trade disciplines needed to reflect the importance of these new activities to the global economy. Given the political will, it can do the same again to address the digital age. • China is too important to be left out of the system. For economic, political, and strategic reasons, China should be part of the trading system, not simply as a trading nation but as a WTO member bound by its obligations. Virtually every country already is a WTO member or is in the process of joining. 32 While there are genuine questions and challenges to having China in the WTO, the reality is that its importance today is such that it should not be left out. Indeed, its economic power and political importance are such that were it not in the WTO, it could and would seek to create institutions and means of influence over global trade that are more to its liking and where it controls the balance of power. Indeed, through efforts such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and its
Belt and Road Initiative, China already has shown it can and will pursue its own path.
Within that framework, there is a set of options that should be considered.
• Trade: The combination of China and cyber present challenges to which the trading system must adapt. Specifically: should rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and pursue other regional trade agreements with the goal of creating the desired rules of trade for cyber and IP/innovative sectors.
• Investment: The U.S. government already reviews inward investment for national security concerns. It already reviews exports to ensure that sensitive technology is not sold to adversaries. It would seem to make sense that when U.S. firms invest overseas that when a national security issue might arise that such investment also be reviewed to ensure sensitive technology is not transferred abroad.
• Resilience: Cyber-enable theft of IP and business confidential information, whether from China or other predators, remains a significant cost to business and a threat to the trading system. Global supply chains remain vulnerable to disruption. While governments can and must act to discourage predatory policies, business and government alike can help deter predatory practices (government or private) by reducing weaknesses in their digital ecosystems.
• Engage and Challenge: Given global cyber and economic links today, it is unrealistic to think that the United States and its allies should or could reduce engagement in either the 33 As the United States looks to adapt to China and cyber, defense is important, and offense is critical. Defensive measures that seek to limit the impact of cyber or Chinese policies and practices by closing access to the U.S. market may for a time succeed in reducing damage to parts of the U.S. economy. Their focus should be narrowly-tailored to addressing harmful activities that the existing set of international trade rules is ill-equipped to remedy. They are unlikely, however, to address the fundamental issue of sustaining and strengthening the global trading system that cyber has helped to broaden and deepen and on which the most dynamic, leading areas of the U.S.
economy now depends.
The United States therefore needs an offensive, or affirmative, strategy that seeks to shape the system and participant behavior in ways that build on U.S. values and strengths -promoting the free and fair exchange of goods, services and investment; allowing countries to trade on the basis on their comparative advantages and not on artificial strengths garnered through state direction and misdeeds; negotiating agreements that the changing nature of global commercial activity and updating those agreements regularly; enforcing negotiated commitments and, in turn, abiding by its own commitments; developing and strengthening alliances with like-minded partners to set global norms and obligations; and continuing to engage with adversaries so that they have a clear understanding of U.S. positions and the jeopardy they face if the system breaks down.
